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Path Verification is a problem where a verifier would like to determine how
closely a vehicle actually traversed a path that it claims to have traversed. This
problem has critical significances in terms of vehicle mobility. Mobile nodes can be
patrols officers or cab drivers, while respective verifiers can be police dispatchers or
cab operators. In this paper, we design a sensor network assisted technique for vehicle
path verification. In our design, a number of static wireless sensors placed in road
segments will serve as witnesses and certify vehicles as they move. Post movement,
these witness certificates will be utilized by the verifier to derive the actual path of
a suspect vehicle. The challenge now is how to compare a Claimed Path as reported
by the vehicle and the Actual Path derived from witness certificates. In this paper,
we design a simple, yet effective technique for comparing similarity between two
vehicle paths. Our technique extends from Continuous Dynamic Time Warping,
which involves constructing a universal manifold from the two paths and then finding
the geodesic on the resulting polygonal surface (shortest path along the surface) which
is a diagonal from the origin of the surface to the terminal point. This distance is
analogous to the Fre´chet distance and yields a good measure of the similarity between
two paths. Using simulations and real experiments, we demonstrate the performance
of our technique from the perspective of detecting false paths claims from correct ones.
We also design light-weight cryptographic techniques to prevent vehicle masquerading
and certificate forging attacks.
A proof of concept experiment was conducted on the streets of Rolla, Missouri.
A sensor grid was established on a small section of Rolla and a vehicle with a
transmitter was driven through the grid many times. The analysis of the data yielded
results consistent with the expected ones.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular Networking is a topic that is receiving significant attention in the
government, industry and academia. A number of organizations today are investing
in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) to leverage wireless networking support to
improve state-of-the-art in road transportation. The US Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) has allocated 75MHz of spectrum in the 5.9GHz band for
Dedicated Short Range Communications, a set of protocols and standards for
short to medium-range wireless communication for automotive use. Some recent
VANET efforts are the USDOT’s Vehicle Infrastructure Integration (VII), which is
a cooperative initiative between USDOT and automobile manufacturers, focusing
on feasibility of deploying communications systems for safety and efficiency of road
transportation systems [28]. The ERTICO partnership is a multi-sector partnership
pursuing development and deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems across Europe
[26]. Apart from these efforts, a variety of VANET test-beds have been set up
in academia like DRIVE-IN at Carnegie Mellon [24], CarTel at MIT [25], C-VET
and CarTorrent at UCLA [7, 19], DOME testbed at UMASS-Amherst [27] among
others. With the advent of vehicular networking today, a number of applications
previously not possible are now becoming realities. Instances include content sharing
among vehicles, real-time congestion detection, traffic re-routing to improve efficiency,
emergency vehicle preemption etc.
1.1. PROBLEM ADDRESSED AND SIGNIFICANCE
In this thesis, we address a new problem in the realm of vehicular networking:
Given a path claimed to have been taken by a Vehicle V , how can a Verifier S
determine whether or not Vehicle V actually took the path it claims to have taken.
The problem addressed is practical and significant. According to Sergeant Letha
Young at the Missouri S&T Police Department, a central problem for police vehicle
dispatchers is to verify movements of patrol cars between the time they leave the
precinct and when they return. Critical police services like quick response, patrolling
high crime zones and operational efficiency are all related to path verification of patrol
2cars. Path verification could prove useful as unbiased evidence of the exact location
and path of an officer or a police vehicle. Apart from law enforcement, a variety of
other commercial businesses like delivery companies, cab companies, trucking service
operators also face the problem of verifying the paths of vehicles on roads mainly for
operational efficiency reasons.
The most straightforward approach to detect false path claims is to have a
mechanism to track each vehicle as it moves. For instance, a GPS receiver can
be placed in each vehicle and it can report in real time the location of every
vehicle. Unfortunately, this technique incurs significant extra cost per vehicle, and
also significant communication overhead when location updates are sent frequently.
Secondly, and more significantly, we are only interested in verifying whether or not a
claimed path was actually taken. In other words, we would like to simply get a Yes/
No answer to whether or not a claimed path and an actual path are similar. Blindly
tracking and reporting each and every location of the vehicle is clearly an overkill in
such a scenario. Even if a number of actual location updates are provided, manually
comparing them point by point is too time consuming and impractical. Also, a host
of hardware attacks are possible with GPS receivers that can induce false location
claims and are quite hard to detect [29, 31, 30].
Another technique that is commonly used in some police precincts is to perform
image processing on cameras located in patrol cars, and use the time and date
on these cameras to verify mobility claims. Naturally, this technique is also very
time consuming, incurs significant overhead and also can be easily circumvented by
modifying camera settings. Fundamentally the basic limitation in such techniques is
that the mechanism to retrieve the actual path in fact comes from the suspect itself
(i.e., the GPS Receiver or the Police Camera is always physically with the suspect).
There is hence no independent authority that can validate claims. To the best of
our knowledge, a practical, effective and efficient solution to the problem of verifying
path claims of a vehicle is not yet there.
1.2. PROPOSED TECHNIQUE
In this thesis, we design a wireless sensor network assisted technique for vehicle
path verification. In our technique, a number of static wireless sensor motes will
3be deployed at selected positions in roads like traffic lights, road intersections and
highway ramps. In fact, cameras deployed at many urban intersections today are
themselves instances of static sensors. Vehicles moving in roads will periodically
issue broadcast messages. Sensors within the communicating range of a vehicle will
serve as witnesses for the vehicle, and provide it with a certificate authenticating
the vehicle’s time and location. Consider a Vehicle V that has traversed a path
and reports a Claimed Path (CP) to the verifier. A Claimed Path is a set of
〈location, time〉 pairs, denoted as 〈{cl1, cl2, cl3, . . . , cln}, {ct1, ct2, ct3, . . . , ctn}〉, where
cli is the location claimed to have been visited by the vehicle at time cti. From the
certificates provided by the witness sensors, the Verifier will determine an Actual
Path (AP) for Vehicle V . An Actual Path is a set of 〈location, time〉 pairs, denoted
as 〈{al1, al2, al3, . . . , alm}, {at1, at2, at3, . . . , atm}〉, where ali is the location actually
visited by the vehicle at time ati.
In this thesis, we design an algorithm which when given a Claimed Path and an
Actual Path, outputs the Fre´chet distance between them, which in effect measures
the similarity between the two paths. A high Fre´chet distance indicates significant
deviation between the paths, while a low distance indicates significant similarity.
Our algorithm design is partly inspired by recent results in the domain of curve
matching. In particular, our algorithm extends the Continuous Dynamic Time
Warping (CDTW) technique in [13] for matching two curves. The CTDW technique
works by constructing a universal manifold from two given curves and then finding the
geodesic on the resulting polygonal surface (shortest path along the surface) which
is a diagonal from the origin of the surface to the terminal point. While the basic
CDTW technique compares two continuous curves, we propose extensions to the basic
technique in order to compare two vehicular paths to determine an estimate of the
Fre´chet distance between them. We also design simple and light-weight cryptographic
techniques that can defend against attacks that spoof vehicles and the forgery of
witness certificates.
The proposed scheme is evaluated using extensive simulations, and using real
experiments conducted with a network of TelosB sensor motes (see Figure 4.6)
deployed within a small segment in the city of Rolla. Our data demonstrates
that the proposed technique is practical, deployable in urban traffic networks, and
4the Fre´chet distance computed from our technique is highly sensitive to deviations
between claimed and actual paths. We point out that the techniques proposed in
this thesis are not restricted to vehicular applications. They also have applicability in
environments like battlefields that are deployed with static wireless sensor networks
where actors in the network are mobile and assist static sensors while performing the
mission. In such cases, verifying the mobility of actors may be important, and our
techniques can directly apply to verification of actor mobility in such wireless sensor
and actor networks also.
52. RELATED WORK
Clearly one of the main difficulties when deciding how closely an agent followed
a given path, or how well the agent reported the actual path is defining what is meant
by “close”. Many different metrics were considered, many of which were useful to a
certain degree. An additional difficulty was the computational complexity of any
algorithm that determines the similarity between two paths composed of polygonal
chains.
From a mobility perspective, much of the current work in Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSN) is focused on the detection of intruders [1, 4, 14]. If the mobile
node is a vehicle, verification of the location and path of the node becomes of interest
in our communities. Consider a police officer driving a patrol car on a beat. In this
situation we propose a very simple question: how can the police dispatcher or police
captain know if the officer actually patrolled where he or she claims to have patrolled
and how can this be verified? More generally, how can we know if a vehicle has closely
followed the assigned path?
In tracking, the goal of the sensor network is to pro-actively detect where the
intruder is likely to be in space and time. The problem we are addressing is reactive
in the sense that we are interested in whether or not a claimed path was taken by the
suspect vehicle by examining the data post movement. To the best of our knowledge,
such a problem is unique and not yet addressed. Within the realm of WSNs, there
have been a number of recent efforts arguing for their deployment to assist in the
solution of transportation engineering problems. In [22], wireless sensor networks
have been used for vehicle theft detection. The core idea is to allow the sensors in
the vehicles that are parked within the same parking area first form a sensor network,
then monitor and identify possible vehicle thefts by detecting unauthorized vehicle
movement. In [21], the feasibility of WSNs being used for a number of transportation
applications like road safety, traffic control, intelligent traffic management systems are
discussed along with the ensuing challenges from the perspective of data aggregation
and information processing. In [11], wireless sensor networks of multiple modalities
have been used to address the vehicle classification problem, which has a number of
6applications in civilian and military scenarios.
Our research in this thesis is partly inspired by the documented successes of
the research discussed above in using wireless sensor network to address problems in
transportation engineering. With the rich advances in wireless sensing, processing
and communication technologies, coupled with advanced protocols to optimize their
performance and low cost, we envisage WSNs to be widely deployed in emerging traffic
infrastructures. As pointed out earlier, with the ubiquitous deployment of cameras
on roads and traffic lights that can communicate, such a vision is not too far off.
We propose a scheme to use an existing sensor network to verify the claimed path
of a moving node. The core ideas of deploying a wireless sensor network are widely
accepted. They are easy to deploy, well understood, quickly form ad hoc networks,
perform robust routing, and are adaptable to a number of tasks including tracking,
monitoring, surveillance, and other related tasks. Using WSNs for multiple tasks is
already well understood. Our solution does not present a significant additional load
on a WSN deployed for other tasks.
In the presence of an existing WSN, there is one straight forward solution. We
allow the WSN to track the vehicle as it traverses the network. The WSN then
reports back to a Base Station (BS) which sensors detected the vehicle. This solution
presents challenges. First, we do not need to suspect and track all vehicles as typically
only a few are untrusted. Tracking multiple trusted vehicles and reporting back to
the BS consumes large amounts of energy and exposes the location of the sensors
unnecessarily. Second, predicting the movements of the vehicle and triangulation in
a sparse WSN is difficult and unnecessary when we are mainly interested in verifying
a previous movement. Our chief interest is in completed movements, not current
locations. Third, it is unlikely that any vehicle will visit the desired points exactly or
leave the established roadway.
Many different measurements have been defined for ’closeness’ [13, 5] such as
the Hausdorff distance [2, 6, 16]. For our purposes, the most useful measure is the
Fre´chet distance.
2.1. FRE´CHET DISTANCE
The Fre´chet distance comes from the classical problem of walking a dog through
7a park(see Figure 2.1). The man visits the same points in the park but the dog will
typically range from side to side closely following the man’s path but not exactly.
Does the dog follow the man’s path closely each day or does it range further on some
days than on others? How can we measure that ’closeness’? An intuitive way to
understand the meaning of the Fre´chet distance is to consider two sets of linked line
segments, α and β. If the man walks on curve α and the dog walks on curve β, we
can define the Fre´chet distance as the maximum length of a leash between the man
and dog. Formally, let d(p, q) denote the Euclidean distance between two points p
and q on a plane. The Fre´chet distance between α and β at points p and q is given
by [12]:
F (α, β) = minf :[0,1]→α,g:[0,1]→β [max [d(f(t), g(t))]] . (2.1)
where f and g are continuous non-decreasing functions defining the positions of the
man and the dog on the curves α and β at every instant t. If the dog is on an
elastic leash, the length of the leash relates very closely to how similar the two paths
are at any given point. This length, the Fre´chet distance, is a way to measure the
matching between two curves or even two surfaces [5]. Matching curves can be done
in polynomial time with reasonable results. If one curve has n samples and the other
has m samples, the match can be done in O(mn log mn) time [13].
The difficulties lie mainly in two areas; defining good measures for the results,
like many sensor problems, is application dependent. Acceptably close on a battlefield
may not be the same as acceptably close for a police car patrolling a highway.
The other area of difficulty is more problematic. Matching two curves
and finding the distance between them is sensitive to the sampling technique
employed. The techniques developed depend upon translational invariance and
temporal invariance. However, two paths are not the same if one is translated a
distance from the other. We must also determine if the untrusted agent followed the
path in the correct sequence of points. These are two things which traditional curve
matching usually ignores. We must solve the difficult problem of forcing translational
8Frechet Distance
Figure 2.1. The Fre´chet distance
variance, ordering, and time sequencing upon curve matching.
2.2. CDTW
This thesis will use the Continuous Dynamic Time Warping(CDTW) technique
of Efrat et al [13]. The strengths and weaknesses of this technique will be used
to compute measures which will show how closely the untrusted agent follows the
directed path. The concept of forcing the agent path to start and end at the
appropriate way points, what we call a ’force’, is introduced to use the translational
invariance of CDTW to reveal the underlying nature of the agent’s deviations from the
assigned path. Two typical types of variance from the path of way points are studied.
A shift where the agent shadows the way points exactly but at a safe distance and a
spike where the agent follows the way points but quickly leaves and returns to visit
an unauthorized point for other purposes.
93. METHODOLOGY
In this section we present our method to produce secure witness location
certificates. We show a method to use these certificates to generate the actual path
for comparision to the claimed path. We then present an algorithm to generate the
CDTW version of the Fre´chet distance.
3.1. SYSTEM FRAMEWORK
We now present our sensor network based framework for vehicle path verifica-
tion. In our system, a number of wireless sensor motes will be placed on selected
locations in roads. Likely locations can include road intersections, traffic signals,
highway ramps etc. Such sensors can include commercial off the shelf motes like
MicaZ and TelosB motes that have demonstrated communication ranges in excess
of 100 ft, are cheap, tiny and lend themselves for quick deployment. The locations
of sensors are fixed, and energy issues are not considered since they can easily be
powered when deployed statically in roads. All sensors are assumed to be trusted,
and there is some loose time synchronization mechanism in place among all sensors
in the network.
In our system, each vehicle to be verified will be equipped with a wireless
transmitter, that will broadcast a message periodically as it moves. The transmitter in
each vehicle will communicate with sensors deployed on roads using an authentication
protocol. Sensors receiving the broadcast will validate locations of the vehicle as its
moves, and giving each vehicle an unforgeable witness certificate. Post completion of
the path, each vehicle will forward its claimed path and witness certificates from all
sensors to the verifier, from which the actual path is derived. The verifier will then
compute the Fre´chet Distance between the paths. If the computed Fre´chet Distance
is small, the vehicle’s claims are accepted, or rejected otherwise. In the following,
we illustrate our technique via two protocols: Authentication Protocol to Generate
Witness Certificates and Actual Path; and Protocol to Compute the Fre´chet Distance
between two paths.
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3.2. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL TO GENERATE WITNESS
CERTIFICATES AND ACTUAL PATH
Protocol 1 presents our authentication protocol. Just before a Vehicle V starts
its path, the Verifier S will assign a unique random seed RV which is secret to V . As
it moves, V will periodically broadcast Message M = {V, tV ,H(V,RV , tV )}, where H
is a Hash Function known to all parties. Denoting tV and tu are the current times in
Vehicle V and Sensor u respectively, every Sensor u that receives M will first check
if the difference between tV in M and tu in u is less than a system configured . If
not, Sensor u will simply discard M . Otherwise, sensor u will reply back with an
authenticated witness certificate Nu = {u, tV , tu,H(u, tu,H(V,RV , tV ), Eu)}, where
Eu is a key secret to Sensor u. The witness certificate is stored by V , and the process
repeats for every sensor in the path of V . At the conclusion of the path, V will
forward its Claimed Path and all witness certificates to the verifier upon request.
The Verifier S will receive the Claimed Path, CP, and witness certificates from
V , where:
CP = 〈{cl1, cl2, cl3, . . . , cln}, {ct1, ct2, ct3, . . . , ctn}〉.
Consider a certificate from Sensor u, which is
Nu = {u, tV , tu,H(u, tu,H(V,RV , tV ), Eu)}.
The verifier will extract the tV and tu from Nu, and using, RV and Eu (known
to the verifier), it will independently compute H(u, tu,H(V,RV , tV ), Eu). If this does
not match what was found in Nu, the verifier rejects the certificate and reports V as
“Failing Path Verification”. Otherwise, the location of sensor u and tu are added to
the Actual Path of V . The process repeats for all certificates and the Actual Path is
generated. The Claimed Path and Actual Paths are now ready for comparison.
Discussions: The protocol prevents masquerading of Vehicle V . When a
Vehicle V¯ attempts to masquerade as V , it will not have the correct Seed of V . When
the Verifier gets the Witness Certificate from V¯ , Step 24 of Protocol 1 will Fail, and
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Protocol 1 Protocol to Authenticate Certificates and Actual Path
1: Verifier: S; Vehicle: V ; Unique Seed: RV ; Hash Function: H
2: tV = current time in Vehicle V
3: tu = current time in Sensor u
4: Pre-configured acceptable time difference: 
5: for Every Location in Path of V do
6: V → ∗: M
7: M = {V, tV ,H(V,RV , tV )}
8: for Every Sensor u Receiving M do
9: if |tV − tu| <  then
10: u → V : Nu





16: Store Nu for all sensors
17: end for
18: V → S : Set of Witness Certificates for all Sensors
19: V → S : CP 〈{cl1, cl2, cl3, . . . , cln}, {ct1, ct2, ct3, . . . , ctn}〉
20: Following Steps Executed by S
21: for Each Entry in Witness Certificate do
22: Extract X = H(u, tu,H(V,RV , tV ), Eu) from Nu
23: Compute Y = H(u, tu,H(V,RV , tV ), Eu)
24: if X = Y then
25: Add Location of u and tu in Nu to Actual Path of V
26: else
27: Report V as “Failing Path Verification”
28: end if
29: end for
the masquerading is detected. A Vehicle V¯ also cannot create or forge certificates
for a Sensor u. If V¯ attempts to modify the time or the id of the sensor generating
a witness message, again Step 24 will detect this and hence reject V¯ . Note that if
Vehicle V¯ incorrectly reports its time during its broadcast to the sensor network,
the check in Step 9 will fail and V¯ will not get any valid certificate. Note that it
may happen that Vehicle V¯ simply does not broadcast its location for a long time.
The verifier can easily detect this behavior by seeing significant time gaps in witness
certificates and can hence reject such claims easily, provided the density of sensors in
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the network is sufficient.
At the conclusion of Protocol 1, the verifier will either have a valid Actual Path
for Vehicle V for similarity comparison with the Claimed Path, or it will reject the
Claim of V . Since authentication of the temporal (i.e., time) aspect of a Vehicle’s path
is already accomplished in Protocol 1 (via Steps 9 and 24), we ignore the temporal
aspect of Claimed and Actual Paths for following discussions. In other words, the
Claimed Path and Actual Path for similarity comparison from here will only be
denoted by 〈{cl1, cl2, cl3, . . . , cln}〉, 〈{al1, al2, al3, . . . , alm}〉 respectively
3.3. PROTOCOL TO COMPUTE FRE´CHET DISTANCE BETWEEN
TWO PATHS
We now discuss our technique to compare two vehicular paths and determine
the Fre´chet distance between them. First, we present some challenges in the problem,
followed by a technique based on Continuous Dynamic Time Warping to resolve the
challenges. The detailed protocol and modifications to the Continuous Dynamic Time








Figure 3.1. Two path segments (a). Samplings in (b) and (d) are bad. Samplings in
(c) and (d) are good.
Fre´chet distance and Sampling Issues: One of the classical problems of
mathematics is that of defining how closely two curves match. Clearly, our problem
of determining how closely a claimed path is truly followed can be analyzed in this
way. However, the challenge here is how to compare two curves, and measure the
distance between them? A metric for this is called the Fre´chet distance, and is the
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maximum distance between two curves. However, measuring the distance between
two points is trivial, but the same is not true for two curves [2] [3]. Note that in
our problem, the two curves (or rather vehicular paths) we are comparing are not
continuous, and the sampling rate between the Claimed and Actual Paths are clearly
not the same. Very likely, the sampling rate of the Claimed Paths (say from a GPS
device in the vehicle) is much more that the sampling rate of Actual Paths (which
are derived from witness sensors).
Unfortunately, the maximum distance between two curves is wildly sensitive to
the sampling method used. Figure 3.1 illustrates the problem where there are two
curves in Figure 3.1 (a) that we would like to compare, and various samplings of the
two curves are shown in Figure 3.1 (b) to Figure 3.1 (d). As we can see, there are
any number of ways to match the sampled points on two curves. Even if the known
number of points is the same for both curves, there is no guarantee that matching a
point p(i) on one curve with a point q(i) on the other curve (for the same i) will give
correct results. Furthermore, even after such comparisons verifying the result in the
presence of sampling errors is difficult. Taking the mean of all the distances between
matching points looks promising. However, if the same number of points are placed
on both curves, but at different distances along the curve, the results will still be
wrong. In our problem we have no control over the data points on the claimed or the
actual path in either number or placement. If the sampling is done wrong, virtually
any large value is possible for the Fre´chet distance, and the resulting verification check
will be rendered useless. Controlling the sampling rate is hence critical to derive right
measures of the distance between two curves.
Continuous Dynamic Time Warping: Continuous Dynamic Time Warping
(CDTW) is a technique that resolves the sampling challenge [13]. The basic CDTW
consists of constructing a universal manifold from the two paths and then finding the
geodesic on the resulting polygonal surface (shortest path along the surface) which
is a diagonal from the origin of the surface to the terminal point. This distance is
analogous to the Fre´chet distance and is a very good measure of the similarity between
the two curves.
If we construct a virtual manifold, we can use this manifold to control the
sampling of the two paths. Once we have used the segments of the two paths to form
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polygonal patches to make up the manifold, we can place additional points, called
Steiner points, along the edges to control the curve sampling for us. The accuracy of
CDTW can be controlled by the placement of these Steiner points. The more Steiner
points the more accurately we can calculate the geodesic and the closer that value will
be to the Fre´chet distance. Steiner points are placed to provide more granularity to
the geodesic and to force it to more closely approach the exact geodesic. This allows
us to sample the curves as finely as required and match the two samples intelligently
as in Figure 3.1, (c) and (e). Without this method, we could sample the curves as in
Figure 3.1 (b) or (d). In the case of Figure 3.1 (b) or (d), it is easy to see that we could
get a very large and erroneous distance such as distance of segment AB rather than
a more reasonable one such as distance of segment AC. Construction of the manifold
is possible in linear time but finding the geodesic along a set of polygonal patches or
plates is computationally difficult. Note here that since, we are extracting positions
from witness sensors in proximity of a vehicle, there is clearly an inherent error in
position estimation. In our technique we aim to compute approximate values for
the Fre´chet Distance hence significantly saving computational complexity. So in our
technique, while a Fre´chet Distance of zero is unlikely when two paths are practically
the same, a reasonable small value is accepted as both two paths being actually the
same.
Constructing the Manifold: A manifold is constructed deriving from the
technique as in [13] using the set of way points as one polygonal chain and the agent
locations as determined from the sensor network for the other chain. Consider two
points, cpi and apj , from which we construct a patch, Pij , by the Minkowski negative
sum of CP 	 AP , as in Figure 3.2. We define the standard Minkowski Sum, ⊕, and
negative Minkowski Sum, 	, as
CP ⊕ AP = {cpi + apj |cpi ∈ CP, apj ∈ AP} (3.1)
CP 	 AP = CP ⊕ (−AP ). (3.2)
The distance between points (i, j) and (i+ 1, j + 1) is minimized when the two
segments are isometric and parallel. Furthermore, the patch may degenerate to a line
or even a single point. If we construct a full set of patches from CP and AP , the
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Figure 3.2. Two path segments and the patch formed from them
resulting diagonal distance from (0, 0) → (n,m) is the DTW version of the Fre´chet
distance.
Figure 3.3. Two path segments and a manifold formed from them
Once the manifold is constructed, Steiner points are placed at equal intervals
on all the edges of each patch. This is done to force the calculated geodesic to more
closely approximate the actual geodesic. The construction of the manifold and the
placement of the Steiner points can be done in linear time, O(mn).
While there are algorithms to exactly find the geodesic on a closed polygonal
surface [20], a wireless sensor network cannot achieve exact accuracy and using CDTW
can provide the desired level of accuracy much quicker than the exact algorithms.
Dijkstra’s method [10] is used to find the shortest path on the manifold from the
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origin to the furthest diagonal endpoint in approximately O(mn lgmn) [10, 9, 32].
This distance is the Fre´chet distance. The Fre´chet distance as determined by CDTW
is then normalized by dividing by the total number of samples on the two curves.
This is done to remove any variance caused by the number of Steiner points used.
This also has the side effect of reducing the Fre´chet distance to a more manageable
number for the user without losing any of its usefulness. For most applications, the
normalized Fre´chet Distance will be much more useful in determining if the vehicle





          (a)           (b) 
Figure 3.4. Claimed and Actual Paths (a), and Resulting Actual Path with Force
Option (b)
Force Option to address Translational Invariance: Note that a feature
of the CTDW technique is that two curves that are translationally invariant (like in
Figures 3.1 (a) and (c)) will yield a Fre´chet distance of zero in the basic technique
[13]. However, two vehicle paths that are translationally invariant are still not be
the same, and must hence yield a high value for the Fre´chet Distance for them to
be considered dissimilar. The issue of translational invariance is resolved using a
simple refinement. Prior to computing the Fre´chet Distance between the Claimed
and Actual Paths, we introduce an option called “Force” wherein the end points of
the Actual Path (i.e., origin and destination) are forced to be the end points of the
Claimed Path (i.e., origin and destination). Figure 3.4 shows a simple illustration.
As we see despite both paths being translationally invariant, the “Force” option when
implemented changes the shape of the Actual Path and hence the computed Fre´chet
Distance will realistically capture the scenario of both paths being dissimilar, which
cannot be accomplished with existing CDTW technique.
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The entire sequence of steps is illustrated in Protocol 2.
Protocol 2 Curve Match Protocol to Compute Fre´chet Distance
Curve Match
1: procedure Input both paths
2: Read m locations in Claimed Path
3: Read n locations in Actual Path
4: Force start and end points of Actual Path to be Claimed Paths
5: Force end point apn = cpm
6: end procedure
7: procedure Construct manifold (m,n)
8: Construct empty 2 PL manifold as an m by n array
9: while more claimed points do
10: while more agent points do




15: procedure Expand array
16: Place Steiner points along “horizontal” segments
17: Place Steiner points along “vertical” segments
18: Place Steiner points in the interior of each patch
19: end procedure
20: procedure Fre´chet distance across the manifold
21: while unprocessed patches do
22: Patch-wise Dijkstra to corner closest to origin
23: for each point, including Steiner points do
24: run Dijkstra Shortest Path Algorithm





30: Compute path difference
31: Fre´chet distance from Patch-wise Dijkstra . This is point.distance(m,n)
32: Compute mean Fre´chet Distance per sample
33: end procedure
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4. SIMULATION AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Our study was divided into two parts: simulation and experimental ”proof of
concept.” Before we could design actual experiments, simulation was required to prove
the algorithms could detect the expected spoofing actions of a vehicle.
4.1. SIMULATION BASED STUDY
A simulator was developed and a number of possible path deviations were
simulated and studied. The simulator was designed to be open-ended to allow for
future capabilities.
4.1.1. Simulation of a Wireless Sensor Network. The simulator was
developed to generate reasonable sample data(see Protocol 3). To be useful, the
simulator had to be simple, quick, and generate random accurate data. The difficulties
in generating the data by hand were too daunting.
Condition 4.1.1. The sensors are deployed at random over a planar field F0, with
a sensing area of A0
1.
Condition 4.1.2. It is desirable to be able to generate sensors with a common sensing
range as well as sensors with varying ranges. A user option was designed into the
simulator to allow sensors to be generated with constant ranges or with sensing ranges
that varied at random over a predefined set of sensing ranges.
Condition 4.1.3. Each sensor must be placed at random within the sensor field.
Condition 4.1.4. No two sensors can be at the exact same location.
4.1.2. Overview. The problem of creating sensor data by hand to test
the algorithms proved to be very difficult. The solution was to create a very simple
simulator to produce a set of sensor reports based upon user selected parameters, the
dimension of the sensor field F0, the number of sensors to be placed at random, the
minimum sensing range of the sensors, an optional amount by which the sensing range
may be increased for random varying ranges, and a set of points the agent visits.
1For future work, we will include an option to allow the sensors to be deployed based on real
road topologies to represent urban traffic networks.
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Protocol 3 Sensor Field Simulator
Simulator
1: Get user selections from global variables in source
2: procedure Generate Sensor Field
3: while more sensors to place do
4: Generate unique random sensor ID
5: Generate random x and y between (0, 0) and max (x, y)
6: if a sensor has already been placed at (x, y) then
7: Reject this location and try again
8: end if
9: if user selected for random ranges then
10: Generate sensing range between 0 and max range
11: else
12: set sensing range to max range
13: end if
14: Add sensor to linked list of sensors
15: end while
16: end procedure
17: procedure Create Agent Path
18: Load agent points from a text file
19: if user selected to add additional points then
20: for each segment of the agent path do
21: Add a random number of points on the segment
22: end for
23: end if
24: timestamp ← 0
25: while there are agent points to process do
26: Add 1 to the timestamp to simulate time passing
27: for each sensor do
28: if agent point within current sensor range then
29: Create event (sensor ID, timestamp, and distance)
30: Add event to list
31: end if
32: end for
33: Move to next agent point
34: end while
35: end procedure
36: procedure Output Data for Curve Match
37: Shuffle the sensor list
38: Shuffle the event list
39: Write the sensor list to a text file
40: Write the event list to a text file
41: Display field statistics
42: end procedure
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4.1.3. User Options. The simulator has a number of options that can be
selected by the user. These options are controlled by global booleans in the source.
This approach was taken to relieve the user from being forced to provide console input
for each run. Only the most important options are given below.
debug Used to control the production of extra console messages that are intended
for debugging the code.
reload Used to suppress the generation of randomly placed sensors with random
maximum ranges. This is intended to allow the same sensor field to be used for
multiple runs of the simulator. This was very useful in examining the operation of
the Curve Matching algorithm.
number of sensors Used to specify how many sensors to generate and place at
random in the sensor field.
range Used to select the range of the sensors. The user can select a common range
or ask for random ranges.
field size Used to specify the maximum x and y size of the sensor field. The details
of how the simulator works can be determined from the algorithm, but an overview
will be given here.
4.1.4. Brief program description. The user selected number of sensors are
placed at random (x, y) coordinates within the sensor field with a random sensor ID. If
a sensor is to be placed on top of another sensor, the random location is discarded and
a new random location generated. To preserve the Poisson distribution properties,
no allowance is made for the sensor location other than that it be within the sensor
field. The range of the sensor is set to the user selected minimum range. If the user
has selected an amount by which the range can vary, a random range from zero to
the varying amount is added to the range. The sensor is then added to the list of
sensors. This process continues until all the sensors have been created and placed.
A simple text file is then read for the (x, y) locations which the agent is to visit.
These may, or may not, be the same as the way points the agent has been assigned
to visit. The simulator has the ability to generate additional points at random on the
line segments connecting the points read from the text file. This is done to simulate
the agent traveling at an inconstant rate as would be expected in a real situation.
Each point is then assigned a time one ’second’ after the previous point.
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The set of agent points generated by the simulator from the user input plus the
randomly generated additional points is then processed in time sequence. For each
point the sensor field is swept for the sensors that should sense the agent at that
point. For each such sensor a report is generated with the sensor ID, time stamp,
and range to the agent. These reports are held in a linked list for future processing.
When all of the agent points have been processed and all of the sensor reports
generated, the simulator generates two text files for the Curve Match program. The
first file contains the sensor information; i.e., the sensor ID, x, y coordinates, and
sensing range. The file is generated in random order to simulate the expected lack of
order in a real situation. The second file is the file of sensor reports generated by the
simulator. This file contains one record for each report. The record consists of sensor
ID, time stamp, and range to target. This file is also produced in random order to
more closely simulate the expected real output of a sensor field.
The simulator is constructed in such a way that data about the k-coverage of
the simulated sensor field could be easily calculated and displayed for the user. In
practice, this turned out to be very useful.
We now analyze the performance of our proposed curve matching technique
using simulations. The idea is to understand the sensitivity (or the trend) of the
Fre´chet distance computed to various practical deviations between a Claimed and
Actual Path. Note that sensitivity for more complex path deviations can be analyzed
by integrating sensitivity of simple deviations. For all simulations below, we consider
the Actual Path to be a straight line of length 15 units.
Sensitivity of Fre´chet distance to Translationally Invariant Paths: In
Figure 4.1, we study the sensitivity of Fre´chet distance to Claimed Paths that are
translationally invariant to the Actual Path. By translationally invariant, we refer
to paths that are exactly similar in shape, length and direction to the Actual Path,
but are offset by a certain length. The X-axis in Figure 4.1 denotes the offset length
the Claimed and Actual Path and the Y-axis is the Fre´chet distance between them.
As we can see with increasing offset length, the Fre´chet distance computed by our
protocol increases demonstrating increasing dissimilarity between the paths.
Sensitivity of Fre´chet distance to Reverse Paths: In Figure 4.2, we study



































Figure 4.1. Shifted Path and Fre´chet Distance
except for one being the exact reverse of the other in directionality. As we can
see when the path length increases, the Fre´chet distance increases, since reverse
directionality with increasing path lengths mean two paths becoming increasingly
dissimilar.
Sensitivity of Fre´chet distance to Paths Spikes: Finally, in Figure 4.3, we
study the sensitivity of Fre´chet distance to two paths that overlap each other except
there being a spike in one of paths compared to the other (similar to Figure 4.4 (d)).
One of the paths is a straight line length 15 units, and other path is similar to this
one but for the spike. The X-axis in Figure 4.3 denotes the (to and fro) length of
the spike, while the Y-axis is the Fre´chet distance. Clearly, increasing spike lengths
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Figure 4.4. A Typical Spike Path
We now report results from real experiments conducted with a wireless sensor
network and a single car in the city of Rolla (Missouri, USA). A section in Rolla
was chosen for experiments as seen in Figure 4.5, where the circles denote locations
where sensor motes were placed. The motes (20 in number) were TelosB motes whose
details are shown in Figure 4.6. A laptop with a TelosB mote attached to transmitted
and received packets from static motes. The transmitter mote was connected to a
Laptop, and was placed in a Toyota Prius Car and driven around the experimental
site. The average speed of the car was 15mph. For our experiments, we did not
observe any packet drops during two way communication between the static motes
and the mote in the car. The responses (i.e., witness certificates) from static motes
was recorded in the Laptop to derive the Actual Path and compared with the Claimed
Path post completion to compute the Fre´chet Distance between them. For simplicity,
a Cartesian Coordinate system was used for locations. However, using a coordinate
system like GPS is straightforward as well.
Note that for proof of concept, only one car was used. As such, the car and sensor
motes did not execute the Authentication Protocol in Protocol 1 for experiments
conducted. We point out that the feasibility of hash functions in sensor networks has
been well studied in works like [8, 18, 23], and as such, we did not emphasize it in our
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TI MSP430 16bit 
Microcontroller 
Program flash  48kB 
RAM   10kB 
Clock Speed   8MHz 
Baud Rate   250Kbaud 
Figure 4.6. Specifications of TelosB motes
experiments. In our experiments, as the car moves, the laptop recorded the witness
certificates from sensors in its path that consisted of the sensor’s location and current
time, which became the Actual Path. Implementing and experimenting with the
complete technique (including Authentication) with multiple cars is a part of future
work. Also, due to space limitations, results from only selected (but generalizable)
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test cases are reported here. The conclusions we derive here did hold for many other
cases not reported here. For all the following discussions, a grid layout of the actual
experimental site is used for illustration purposes.
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4.3. RESULTS
Test Case 1: Figure 4.7 shows a test where the car was driven through four
blocks from West to East on 4th Street. When the Claimed Path was correctly
reported the Fre´chet Distance was zero. However, for two incorrectly reported
Claimed Paths (dotted paths in Figure 4.7, the Fre´chet Distance was large. Thus,
paths reverse of the Actual Path, and Paths offset from the Actual Path are easily
detected as fake.
Freschet Distance for                          :   300.0m 
Freschet Distance for                          :   261.8m 
(140,0) (0,0) 
(0,105) (140, 105) 
Figure 4.7. Detecting Reverses and Offsets
Test Case 2: The second experiment involved an Actual Path on 2nd Street
four blocks West to East. This time also, the Fre´chet Distance between the reverse
path and a path that deviates from the Actual Path with a spike are easily detected
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as fake as seen in Figure 4.8). Note that the path exhibiting the spike is in the same
direction as the Actual Path. If such a path were in reverse direction, the Fre´chet
Distance would be even larger
Freschet Distance for                          :   300.0m 
Freschet Distance for                          :   419.9m 
(140,0) (0,0) 
(0,105) (140, 105) 
Figure 4.8. Detecting Reverses and Spikes
Test Case 3: For this case, the Actual Path consisted of traversing all 19 blocks
in the experimental site in the trajectory shown in Figure 4.9. We consider a Claimed
Path that still traverses 19 blocks, but reports as skipping the intersections of Elm
and 4th Street, and Elm and 3rd Street. The corresponding Fre´chet Distance is quite
high, and hence is detected as fake.
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Figure 4.9. Detecting Complex Deviations
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5. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a method to verify the matching of a vehicle’s actual path as
reported by a wireless sensor network with its claimed path as reported by the driver.
The difficulty lies in determining the exact situation if the vehicle actually deviated
from the claimed path. There are a number of intuitive solutions such as GPS, but
GPS is expensive and there are known hardware attacks to allow the positions to
be wrongly reported. On the battlefield, one would expect GPS to be spoofed or
jammed [15] [31] [30]. At the very best, GPS data requires time and expense to
analyze. What is wanted is a “yes/no” answer or a simple to understand metric. The
number of possible metrics is quite large with many metrics examined being found to
be unsuitable for the problem at hand.
5.1. UNSUITABLE METRICS EXAMINED
Euclidean distance from a detection point to the claimed path.
The first metric we examined was to find the Euclidean distance from each detection
point to the claimed path. This presented a number of difficulties. The distance was
sensitive to the choice of claimed path segment, or even worse which claimed point,
to measure the deviation. It became obvious very early on that the only possible
choice was to determine the perpendicular distance from the detection point to the
claimed path segment that yielded the smallest distance. The choice appeared to
involve either a judgment (human intervention) or an exhaustive search of all possible
segments and this search would need to be repeated for each detection point. In a
dense sensor network this would be computationally prohibitive.
The second issue with using the Euclidean distance from each detection point
to the claimed path arises from sampling methods. The simple sum of the distances
was wildly sensitive to the sampling method as was the mean of the distances zx(see
Figure 3.1). It was easy to determine that a clever sampling of the detected points
could yield any desired mean Euclidean distance.
Path length comparison between Actual Path and Claimed Path
Another naive approach would be to simply compare the length of the Actual and
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Claimed paths. The vehicle would clearly trace a longer actual path if it left the
path and then returned; however, in our experiment we clearly showed a number
of possible exploits that the vehicle could use to disguise a path variation. Taken
alone, the difference in path lengths is not a useful measurement. It does give some
additional useful information in specific cases such as when the node retraces a small
portion of the path.
5.2. CONTINUOUS DYNAMIC TIME WARPING
CDTW was developed as an effective way to compare two curves and deter-
mining a matching metric. All of the issues we have dealt with in comparing two
paths arise in curve comparison. The same questions of how closely two paths match,
what kinds of metrics are useful, and what exactly is met by close also arise in curve
matching. The main differences between the two problems arise in how the sampling
is done and how to deal with the problems of invariance.
The two different techniques of Dynamic Time Warping, Continuous and simple
DTW, both approach the problem by first constructing a chain from the sampled
points. This lends itself much better to our problem as we defined the claimed path
in terms of a number of points the vehicle was asked to visit in a specific order. The
actual path the node followed was determined by constructing a chain from a number
of sensor location reports. It turns out that comparing two chains is much simpler
than comparing two smooth curves, indeed the most effective way to compare two
curves using CDTW is to sample the curves and use the samples to construct chains.
This sampling can be made as accurately as desired given sufficient computing power.
The issue of invariance is more problematic but simple to solve. When
comparing two curves, the goal is to recognize the similarities regardless of the
presentation of the curves. CDTW is able to provide good results regardless of the
orientation of the curves (translational invariance). If this same technique were used
in path matching, a path that follows the claimed path at a constant distance (see
Figure 4.1) would return a prefect match. This would defeat our purpose.
Another type of invariance that creates issues is directional invariance. Two
curves can match exactly even if one is drawn in the opposite direction from the
other. In fact, when matching curves it is critical that the curves not have any
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directional sense at all. This would defeat our purposes. When matching paths, it is
critical that we take direction into account. We wish to enforce a directional sense
on the vehicle so that it is known to have visited the claimed points in the claimed
order. A direct consequence of directional sense is the notion of time. Given the times
and locations a node is detected leads directly to the ability to match direction and
time between two paths. However, it should be noted that the sense of time is often
relative (point a before point b) due to problems in synchronizing clocks in sensor
networks.
We resolved these issues by imposing boundary conditions on the actual path. If
the vehicle is not detected within a reasonable distance of the claimed starting point,
the paths are forced to match by pre-pending claimed starting point to the actual
path. If the vehicle is not detected at the claimed path ending point, the claimed
path ending point is appended to the actual path. In simple terms, the two paths are
forced to begin and end at the same location and time. This forces a change to the
shape of the actual path which the protocol easily detects. In addition to removing
translational invariance, the boundary conditions enforce direction and time sense on
the curve matching.
5.3. FUTURE WORK
During the experimental phase of this work, some future extensions became
clear. There are other possible problem behaviors that will be considered in a future
enhancement of the procedures. For example, how can we determine if a gap in
detection is unreasonable? If the agent simply turns off the mobile node for a period
of time we must be able to determine if the agent should have been detected by a
sensor node. To determine the reasonable allowable gaps in sensing, we need to know
the mean free path of a mobile node through a sensor field.
5.3.1. Mean Free Path Through a Sparse Sensor Network. An
important measure of the effectiveness of a sensor network is the distance a mobile
node can move through the network without being detected[17]. This problem is
directly analogous to the problem of the mean free path of a molecule through an
ideal gas.
Condition 5.3.1. The sensors are deployed at random over a planar field F0, with
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a sensing area of A0.
While it is not strictly necessary that the sensors all have a common sensing
range, it makes the calculations much simpler. Therefore, we assume N sensors each
with a sensing range R deployed uniformly at random over the sensing field.
Condition 5.3.2. Each sensor senses in a circular pattern with an area of Ai and a
radius of R.
Problem 1. Calculate the Mean Free Path
Given a sensor field F0 with an area A0 sensed by N sensors (si : i = 1, 2, 3, . . .N) with
sensor si having a sensing area Ai, randomly and independently deployed throughout
F0, compute the probability P (k) that a mobile sensor X randomly crossing A0 is
detected by at least k sensors assuming X is traveling in a straight line.
Definition 1 (Sensing Area). The sensing area Ai of sensor si is the effective target
thickness E (Ti) and defined as a disk of radius ri =
E(Ti)
2
which is identical to the
range of the sensor si.
Theorem 1. Mean Free Path until First Detection
The Mean Free Path[17],E(σ) of a mobile agent node moving in a straight line through




Proof. A target X can move a distance σ undetected if the trajectory does not
intercept the sensing area of any sensor. When all sensors have the identical sensing
areas, the target is undetected if, and only if, its trajectory does not come within
a distance of E(T )
2
of any sensor. This is equivalent to considering the target node
to have an effective thickness of E(T) and the sensors to be points with an effective
sensing range of zero. When the mobile node moves a distance of σX , it sweeps
out an area of size, F (σX) = E(T )σX + f where f is some residual area due to the
geometry of the sensor field not having a straight perimeter normal to the trajectory.
Therefore, the probability that the mobile node X travels a distance σ ≥ σX is equal
to the probability that no sensor is located within F (σX). Given that the sensors are
randomly and equally deployed, the number of sensors within F (σX) is given by a










This equation holds true as F0 → ∞ if the density of sensors, ρ, remains constant.
The probability that the free path of the target X is σX is the same as the probability
that no sensors exist within an area of size F (σX):
P (σ ≥ σX) = P (NF (σX) = 0). (5.2)
e−ρF (σ) = e−ρ(E(T )σ+f). (5.3)









(1− e−ρE(T )Q). (5.5)
where Q is the maximum possible path length through the sensor field along the
trajectory of X. If the residual area f is small enough such that e−ρf ≈ 1 and Q is








5.3.2. Mean Distance to Detection and Coverage Simulator. The ba-
sic simulator was then modified to produce Mean Distance to Detection information.
This is done by generating a sensor field in the same manner as the first simulator.
In order to simplify the calculations, a single sensing range is chosen for all sensors.
An agent path is then chosen with a random x along the y-axis and sent into the
sensor field along a straight line with a random angle to the y-axis. The distance to
first detection is recorded. Data are recorded for each run and analyzed to determine
how well the simulation agrees with the theoretical values. Additionally, the coverage
data for each run are also recorded and compared to the theoretical values.
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5.3.3. Publication. A condensed version of this work, with extensions in the
field of vehicular tracking, is planned for future publication. This work will include the
experiments discussed in this thesis as well as attempts to detect tampering with the
mobile node such as turning the node on and off to avoid detection of path deviations.
The security certificate exchange presented here will be implemented on the mobile
node and sensor network. Other extensions will surely present themselves during the
completion of the proposed paper.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, we study the issue of path verification of mobile vehicles. The
problem has practical significance to a number of organizations including police
precincts, cab operators, trucking companies etc. Our proposed solution leverages
wireless sensor network support to authenticate vehicle movements. Then we designed
a protocol to compute the Fre´chet Distance between a claimed path reported by a
vehicle and an actual path derived from certificates provided by sensors. Extensive
simulations and real experiments conducted in Rolla validate our proposed techniques.
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